Files
gh-christianlouis-dmarq/backend/app/core/security.py
T
copilot-swe-agent[bot] 531dc968a8 feat: integrate Logto OIDC for user authentication
- Add Logto OIDC integration (app/core/logto.py): CookieStorage adapter,
  create/decode session token helpers, sync_logto_user upsert
- New auth endpoints (/api/v1/auth): sign-in, callback, sign-out, me
- AuthRedirectMiddleware: protects HTML pages, redirects to /setup when
  Logto is unconfigured, to /login otherwise
- Update require_admin_auth: accepts dmarq_session cookie JWT first,
  then API key, then Bearer JWT (fully backward compatible)
- Update User model: add logto_id, username, picture, created_at, updated_at;
  make hashed_password nullable for Logto-only users; is_superuser default=True
- New Alembic migration d4e5f6a7b8c9 for the above schema changes
- Add LOGTO_ENDPOINT / LOGTO_APP_ID / LOGTO_APP_SECRET / LOGTO_REDIRECT_URI
  settings with logto_configured property
- Create login.html (Sign in with Logto button) and setup.html (step-by-step
  configuration guide)
- Update base.html: user menu with avatar/name and sign-out via Alpine.js
  fetch to /api/v1/auth/me
- Update settings.html: remove localStorage adminApiKey; session cookie is
  sent automatically by browser; add 401 → /login redirect
- Update requirements.txt: replace fastapi-users additions with logto + aiohttp
- Add test_auth.py: 18 new tests covering session tokens, CookieStorage,
  sync_logto_user, /me, /sign-in (503), /sign-out cookie clearing
- Fix test_security_extra.py: pass Request mock to require_admin_auth;
  add new test_valid_session_cookie_returns_auth_context

Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/christianlouis/dmarq/sessions/b448f585-7646-40f8-ae2d-9986c361e3fd

Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-30 10:09:50 +00:00

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import logging
import os
import secrets
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
from typing import Any, Optional, Union
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request, Security, status
from fastapi.security import APIKeyHeader, HTTPAuthorizationCredentials, HTTPBearer
from jose import JWTError, jwt
from passlib.context import CryptContext
from app.core.config import get_settings
settings = get_settings()
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
pwd_context = CryptContext(schemes=["bcrypt"], deprecated="auto")
# Security schemes for authentication
security_bearer = HTTPBearer(auto_error=False)
api_key_header = APIKeyHeader(name="X-API-Key", auto_error=False)
# In-memory API keys storage
# ⚠️ WARNING: This is a simple in-memory implementation suitable for:
# - Development and testing environments
# - Single-instance deployments
# - MVP/prototype applications
#
# ⚠️ NOT SUITABLE FOR PRODUCTION when:
# - Running multiple application instances (keys not shared)
# - Requiring key persistence across restarts
# - Needing key rotation and management
#
# For production, implement:
# - Database-backed key storage (with encryption at rest)
# - Redis or similar distributed cache for shared key storage
# - Integration with external secret management (AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, etc.)
# - Proper key rotation policies
_api_keys = set()
logger.warning(
"Using in-memory API key storage. "
"Keys will be lost on restart. "
"Not suitable for production multi-instance deployments."
)
# Check if running in production mode and warn
if os.getenv("ENVIRONMENT", "development").lower() == "production":
logger.error(
"CRITICAL: Running in PRODUCTION mode with in-memory API key storage! "
"This is NOT recommended for production. "
"Implement database-backed or Redis-based key storage for production deployments."
)
def generate_api_key() -> str:
"""
Generate a secure random API key.
Returns:
A 32-character hexadecimal API key
"""
return secrets.token_hex(32)
def add_api_key(api_key: str) -> bool:
"""
Add an API key to the valid keys set.
Args:
api_key: The API key to add
Returns:
True if key was added, False if it already existed
"""
if api_key in _api_keys:
return False
_api_keys.add(api_key)
logger.info("API key added (length: %d chars)", len(api_key))
return True
def verify_api_key(api_key: str) -> bool:
"""
Verify an API key is valid.
Args:
api_key: The API key to verify
Returns:
True if key is valid, False otherwise
"""
return api_key in _api_keys
async def get_api_key(api_key_value: Optional[str] = Security(api_key_header)) -> str:
"""
Dependency to verify API key authentication.
Args:
api_key_header: API key from X-API-Key header
Returns:
The validated API key
Raises:
HTTPException: If API key is missing or invalid
"""
if not api_key_value:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Missing API key",
headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "ApiKey"},
)
if not verify_api_key(api_key_value):
suffix = api_key_value[-8:] if len(api_key_value) >= 8 else "invalid"
logger.warning("Invalid API key attempt: ...%s", suffix)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Invalid API key",
headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "ApiKey"},
)
return api_key_value
async def verify_token(
credentials: Optional[HTTPAuthorizationCredentials] = Security(security_bearer),
) -> dict:
"""
Dependency to verify JWT token authentication.
Args:
credentials: Bearer token from Authorization header
Returns:
Decoded token payload
Raises:
HTTPException: If token is missing or invalid
"""
if not credentials:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Missing authentication token",
headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"},
)
token = credentials.credentials
try:
payload = jwt.decode(token, settings.SECRET_KEY, algorithms=[settings.ALGORITHM])
return payload
except JWTError as e:
logger.warning("Invalid JWT token: %s", str(e))
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Invalid authentication token",
headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"},
) from e
async def require_admin_auth(
request: Request,
api_key: Optional[str] = Security(api_key_header),
bearer: Optional[HTTPAuthorizationCredentials] = Security(security_bearer),
) -> dict:
"""
Dependency to require authentication for admin/API endpoints.
Accepts (in priority order):
1. ``dmarq_session`` cookie set after a successful Logto login.
2. ``X-API-Key`` header static admin key for programmatic access.
3. ``Authorization: Bearer <token>`` header app-issued JWT.
Returns an authentication context dict describing how the request was
authenticated. Raises ``HTTP 401`` when no valid credential is present.
"""
# 1. Session cookie (Logto-backed app session)
from app.core.logto import SESSION_COOKIE, decode_session_token # local import
session_token = request.cookies.get(SESSION_COOKIE)
if session_token:
user_id = decode_session_token(session_token)
if user_id is not None:
return {"auth_type": "session", "user_id": user_id}
# 2. Static admin API key
if api_key and verify_api_key(api_key):
return {"auth_type": "api_key", "api_key": api_key}
# 3. Bearer JWT (app-issued; also covers Bearer tokens set by older clients)
if bearer:
from app.core.logto import decode_session_token as _dec # local import
user_id = _dec(bearer.credentials)
if user_id is not None:
return {"auth_type": "bearer", "user_id": user_id}
# Fallback: legacy python-jose JWT (pre-Logto API keys / CI tokens)
try:
payload = jwt.decode(
bearer.credentials, settings.SECRET_KEY, algorithms=[settings.ALGORITHM]
)
return {"auth_type": "jwt", "payload": payload}
except JWTError as e:
logger.warning("Invalid Bearer JWT: %s", str(e))
# No valid authentication
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail="Authentication required. Provide a session cookie, X-API-Key header, or Bearer token.",
headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "ApiKey, Bearer"},
)
def create_access_token(subject: Union[str, Any], expires_delta: timedelta = None) -> str:
"""
Create a JWT access token for authentication
"""
if expires_delta:
expire = datetime.utcnow() + expires_delta
else:
expire = datetime.utcnow() + timedelta(minutes=settings.ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES)
to_encode = {"exp": expire, "sub": str(subject)}
encoded_jwt = jwt.encode(to_encode, settings.SECRET_KEY, algorithm=settings.ALGORITHM)
return encoded_jwt
def verify_password(plain_password: str, hashed_password: str) -> bool:
"""
Verify a password against its hash
"""
return pwd_context.verify(plain_password, hashed_password)
def get_password_hash(password: str) -> str:
"""
Hash a password
"""
return pwd_context.hash(password)