🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix SSRF bypass on DNS resolution failure

Modified `is_private_ip` in `app/utils/network.py` to fail securely by returning True (blocking the request) when a hostname cannot be resolved. The previous implementation failed open, creating a risk for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and DNS rebinding attacks.

Updated corresponding tests to expect the secure behavior and correctly appended the security finding to the Sentinel journal.

Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
google-labs-jules[bot]
2026-03-23 15:25:53 +00:00
parent ef897f660d
commit 06b0fced38
4 changed files with 24 additions and 7 deletions
+5
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@@ -6,3 +6,8 @@
**Vulnerability:** The `_test_webdav_connection` function used `urllib.request.urlopen`, which natively supports dangerous schemes like `file://` or `ftp://` and follows redirects by default, potentially allowing SSRF bypasses or Local File Inclusion.
**Learning:** `urllib.request` should be avoided for user-supplied URLs. Even when URL schemes are manually validated, `urllib`'s default redirect following behavior can bypass SSRF protections (e.g. redirecting to `127.0.0.1`).
**Prevention:** Use a modern, safer HTTP client like `httpx` with `follow_redirects=False` when testing user-provided URLs.
## 2025-05-18 - [SSRF Bypass via DNS Resolution Failure]
**Vulnerability:** The `is_private_ip` function in `app/utils/network.py` failed open (returned `False`) when a hostname could not be resolved (`socket.gaierror`).
**Learning:** This fail-open pattern was originally added to allow external domains in tests, but in production, it created a severe SSRF risk. An attacker could bypass SSRF protections by providing a URL that fails to resolve during the security check but resolves later (DNS rebinding), or by exploiting internal routing behaviors via unresolvable addresses.
**Prevention:** Always fail securely in network authorization functions. If a domain cannot be resolved to verify its safety, the request must be blocked (`return True` / default-deny). Tests should mock DNS resolution correctly instead of compromising production security logic.
+5 -5
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@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ def is_private_ip(hostname: str) -> bool:
return True
return False
except (socket.gaierror, socket.error):
# Cannot resolve - allow for testing/development
# In production, DNS should work properly
# Log this for debugging
logger.warning(f"Could not resolve hostname: {hostname}")
return False # Changed from True to False to allow external domains in tests
# Cannot resolve.
# Fail securely: block unresolved domains to prevent DNS rebinding
# and SSRF bypasses via unresolvable addresses.
logger.warning(f"Could not resolve hostname (blocking securely): {hostname}")
return True
+2 -2
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@@ -520,14 +520,14 @@ class TestURLUploadAdditionalCoverage:
assert exc_info.value.status_code == 400
def test_is_private_ip_unresolvable_hostname(self):
"""Cover DNS resolution failure branch (lines 67-72)."""
"""Cover DNS resolution failure branch blocking unresolvable domains."""
import socket as _socket
from app.utils.network import is_private_ip
with patch("socket.getaddrinfo", side_effect=_socket.gaierror("nope")):
result = is_private_ip("nonexistent.invalid.hostname.test")
assert result is False
assert result is True # Fail securely by returning True
def test_is_private_ip_hostname_resolves_to_private(self):
"""Cover branch where hostname resolves to a private IP (line 64-65)."""
+12
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@@ -698,6 +698,18 @@ class TestURLUploadCoverageGaps:
assert result is False
mock_getaddrinfo.assert_called_once()
@patch("app.utils.network.socket.getaddrinfo")
def test_is_private_ip_unresolvable_hostname_fails_securely(self, mock_getaddrinfo):
"""Test that unresolvable hostnames fail securely by blocking access."""
import socket
from app.utils.network import is_private_ip
mock_getaddrinfo.side_effect = socket.gaierror("Name or service not known")
result = is_private_ip("unresolvable.example.internal")
assert result is True # Fails securely
@patch("socket.getaddrinfo")
def test_is_private_ip_hostname_resolves_multiple_ips_all_public(self, mock_getaddrinfo):
"""Test hostname with multiple public IPs returns False (covers 65->61 loop branch)"""