fix: resolve ssrf verification issue and xss in frontend
Resolves a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in `frontend/templates/files.html` by applying `escapeHtml` and `sanitizeHighlight` functions when injecting search result attributes directly into the DOM via `innerHTML`. Also fixes an issue in `app/api/url_upload.py` where providing the `event_hooks` argument twice caused a `SyntaxError` (and potentially bypassed security hooks). Both `validate_redirect` and `verify_redirect` hooks are now safely consolidated into a single list for the `httpx.AsyncClient` initialization. Also updates tests and .gitignore to prevent CI issues. Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -200,3 +200,5 @@ cython_debug/
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# Build metadata files - generated at build time
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# Build metadata files - generated at build time
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GIT_SHA
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GIT_SHA
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RUNTIME_INFO
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RUNTIME_INFO
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node_modules
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frontend/node_modules
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@@ -28,3 +28,7 @@
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**Vulnerability:** The `/process-url` endpoint used `httpx.AsyncClient(follow_redirects=True)` after validating the initial user-provided URL against SSRF protections. However, it did not validate the target URLs of any subsequent HTTP redirects, allowing an attacker to provide a safe URL that redirects to an internal/private IP, bypassing the security check.
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**Vulnerability:** The `/process-url` endpoint used `httpx.AsyncClient(follow_redirects=True)` after validating the initial user-provided URL against SSRF protections. However, it did not validate the target URLs of any subsequent HTTP redirects, allowing an attacker to provide a safe URL that redirects to an internal/private IP, bypassing the security check.
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**Learning:** Initial URL validation is insufficient when the HTTP client is configured to follow redirects automatically. The client must be explicitly configured to validate every redirect target.
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**Learning:** Initial URL validation is insufficient when the HTTP client is configured to follow redirects automatically. The client must be explicitly configured to validate every redirect target.
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**Prevention:** When using `httpx.AsyncClient(follow_redirects=True)` for user-provided URLs, always implement a redirect validator hook function (e.g., using `event_hooks={'response': [validate_redirect]}`) that resolves the `Location` header and passes it through the same SSRF validation logic before the redirect is followed.
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**Prevention:** When using `httpx.AsyncClient(follow_redirects=True)` for user-provided URLs, always implement a redirect validator hook function (e.g., using `event_hooks={'response': [validate_redirect]}`) that resolves the `Location` header and passes it through the same SSRF validation logic before the redirect is followed.
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## 2026-05-03 - XSS in Frontend Templates
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**Vulnerability:** In `frontend/templates/files.html`, dynamic variables directly set to `innerHTML` when interpolating results using template strings led to DOM-based XSS when rendering malicious file titles, tags, doc types, filenames, or snippets.
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**Learning:** Bypassing `textContent` rendering for UI layout (using JS template strings setting `innerHTML` directly) implicitly trusts back-end structured data. Because backend models (like filenames and OCR tags) may contain unfiltered special characters (like `<` and `>`), this exposes the frontend to stored XSS if not explicitly escaped.
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**Prevention:** Apply `escapeHtml` to any strings embedded directly into template strings assigned to `innerHTML`. If the data includes specific formatting to retain (like `<mark>` tags from search tools), provide a robust custom sanitizer like `sanitizeHighlight` that safely encodes everything except the allowed tags.
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+1
-15
@@ -170,19 +170,6 @@ async def process_url(
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if not safe_filename:
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if not safe_filename:
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safe_filename = "download"
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safe_filename = "download"
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# Hook to validate redirects and prevent SSRF
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async def validate_redirect(response: httpx.Response):
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if response.is_redirect:
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location = response.headers.get("Location")
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if location:
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# Resolve relative URLs
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next_url = urllib.parse.urljoin(str(response.url), location)
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try:
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validate_url_safety(next_url)
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except HTTPException as e:
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# Reraise as a RequestError so httpx aborts the request
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raise httpx.RequestError(f"Unsafe redirect target: {e.detail}", request=response.request)
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# Download file with security measures
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# Download file with security measures
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# Initialize target_path to None to prevent UnboundLocalError in exception handlers
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# Initialize target_path to None to prevent UnboundLocalError in exception handlers
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# that may execute before target_path is assigned during error cases
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# that may execute before target_path is assigned during error cases
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@@ -194,11 +181,10 @@ async def process_url(
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async with httpx.AsyncClient(
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async with httpx.AsyncClient(
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timeout=settings.http_request_timeout,
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timeout=settings.http_request_timeout,
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follow_redirects=True,
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follow_redirects=True,
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event_hooks={"response": [validate_redirect]},
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event_hooks={"response": [verify_redirect]},
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headers={
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headers={
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"User-Agent": "DocuElevate/1.0", # Identify ourselves
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"User-Agent": "DocuElevate/1.0", # Identify ourselves
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},
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},
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event_hooks={"response": [verify_redirect]},
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) as client:
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) as client:
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async with client.stream("GET", url) as response:
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async with client.stream("GET", url) as response:
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response.raise_for_status()
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response.raise_for_status()
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@@ -1538,6 +1538,28 @@
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});
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});
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}
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}
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function escapeHtml(str) {
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if (!str) return '';
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return String(str)
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.replace(/&/g, '&')
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.replace(/</g, '<')
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.replace(/>/g, '>')
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.replace(/"/g, '"')
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.replace(/'/g, ''');
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}
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function sanitizeHighlight(html) {
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if (!html) return '';
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let safe = String(html)
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.replace(/<mark>/gi, '\x00MARK_OPEN\x00')
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.replace(/<\/mark>/gi, '\x00MARK_CLOSE\x00');
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safe = escapeHtml(safe);
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safe = safe
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.replace(/\x00MARK_OPEN\x00/g, '<mark>')
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.replace(/\x00MARK_CLOSE\x00/g, '</mark>');
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return safe;
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}
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function renderSearchResults(data, q) {
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function renderSearchResults(data, q) {
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const panel = document.getElementById('search-results-panel');
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const panel = document.getElementById('search-results-panel');
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const list = document.getElementById('search-results-list');
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const list = document.getElementById('search-results-list');
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@@ -1555,25 +1577,31 @@
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list.innerHTML = results.map(hit => {
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list.innerHTML = results.map(hit => {
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const fmt = hit._formatted || {};
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const fmt = hit._formatted || {};
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const title = fmt.document_title || hit.document_title || hit.original_filename || __i18n.untitled;
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const titleRaw = fmt.document_title || hit.document_title || hit.original_filename || __i18n.untitled;
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const filename = fmt.original_filename || hit.original_filename || '';
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const filenameRaw = fmt.original_filename || hit.original_filename || '';
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const snippet = fmt.ocr_text || '';
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const snippetRaw = fmt.ocr_text || '';
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const tags = Array.isArray(hit.tags) ? hit.tags.join(', ') : (hit.tags || '');
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const tagsRaw = Array.isArray(hit.tags) ? hit.tags.join(', ') : (hit.tags || '');
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const docType = hit.document_type || '';
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const docTypeRaw = hit.document_type || '';
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const safeTitle = (fmt.document_title) ? sanitizeHighlight(titleRaw) : escapeHtml(titleRaw);
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const safeFilename = escapeHtml(filenameRaw);
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const safeSnippet = sanitizeHighlight(snippetRaw);
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const safeTags = escapeHtml(tagsRaw);
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const safeDocType = escapeHtml(docTypeRaw);
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return `<div style="padding: 0.75rem 1rem; border-bottom: 1px solid #f3f4f6; display: flex; gap: 0.75rem; align-items: flex-start;">
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return `<div style="padding: 0.75rem 1rem; border-bottom: 1px solid #f3f4f6; display: flex; gap: 0.75rem; align-items: flex-start;">
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<div style="flex-shrink: 0; color: #3b82f6; font-size: 1.25rem; padding-top: 0.1rem;">
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<div style="flex-shrink: 0; color: #3b82f6; font-size: 1.25rem; padding-top: 0.1rem;">
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<i class="fas fa-file-pdf"></i>
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<i class="fas fa-file-pdf"></i>
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</div>
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</div>
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<div style="flex: 1; min-width: 0;">
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<div style="flex: 1; min-width: 0;">
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<div style="font-weight: 600; font-size: 0.9rem; color: #111827;">${title}</div>
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<div style="font-weight: 600; font-size: 0.9rem; color: #111827;">${safeTitle}</div>
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${filename ? `<div style="font-size: 0.8rem; color: #6b7280; margin-top: 0.15rem;">${filename}</div>` : ''}
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${safeFilename ? `<div style="font-size: 0.8rem; color: #6b7280; margin-top: 0.15rem;">${safeFilename}</div>` : ''}
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${docType ? `<span style="display: inline-block; margin-top: 0.25rem; padding: 0.1rem 0.5rem; background: #eff6ff; color: #1d4ed8; border-radius: 9999px; font-size: 0.75rem;">${docType}</span>` : ''}
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${safeDocType ? `<span style="display: inline-block; margin-top: 0.25rem; padding: 0.1rem 0.5rem; background: #eff6ff; color: #1d4ed8; border-radius: 9999px; font-size: 0.75rem;">${safeDocType}</span>` : ''}
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${tags ? `<span style="display: inline-block; margin-top: 0.25rem; margin-left: 0.25rem; padding: 0.1rem 0.5rem; background: #f0fdf4; color: #15803d; border-radius: 9999px; font-size: 0.75rem;">${tags}</span>` : ''}
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${safeTags ? `<span style="display: inline-block; margin-top: 0.25rem; margin-left: 0.25rem; padding: 0.1rem 0.5rem; background: #f0fdf4; color: #15803d; border-radius: 9999px; font-size: 0.75rem;">${safeTags}</span>` : ''}
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${snippet ? `<div style="margin-top: 0.4rem; font-size: 0.8rem; color: #374151; white-space: pre-wrap; word-break: break-word;">…${snippet}…</div>` : ''}
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${safeSnippet ? `<div style="margin-top: 0.4rem; font-size: 0.8rem; color: #374151; white-space: pre-wrap; word-break: break-word;">…${safeSnippet}…</div>` : ''}
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</div>
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</div>
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<div style="flex-shrink: 0;">
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<div style="flex-shrink: 0;">
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<a href="/files/${hit.file_id}" style="padding: 0.25rem 0.6rem; background: #f3f4f6; color: #374151; border-radius: 0.25rem; font-size: 0.8rem; text-decoration: none; white-space: nowrap;" title="${__i18n.viewFile}">
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<a href="/files/${escapeHtml(hit.file_id)}" style="padding: 0.25rem 0.6rem; background: #f3f4f6; color: #374151; border-radius: 0.25rem; font-size: 0.8rem; text-decoration: none; white-space: nowrap;" title="${__i18n.viewFile}">
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<i class="fas fa-external-link-alt"></i>
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<i class="fas fa-external-link-alt"></i>
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</a>
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</a>
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</div>
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</div>
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@@ -924,3 +924,84 @@ class TestURLUploadCoverageGaps:
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# Should not raise any exception and should ignore missing Location header
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# Should not raise any exception and should ignore missing Location header
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await verify_redirect(resp)
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await verify_redirect(resp)
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@pytest.mark.unit
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class TestURLUploadHooks:
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@patch("app.api.url_upload.httpx.AsyncClient")
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def test_client_initialization_includes_both_hooks(self, mock_client):
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"""Cover the branch where AsyncClient is initialized with event hooks in url_upload (line 197)."""
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import asyncio
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from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, patch
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# We need to simulate process_url calling AsyncClient
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mock_instance = AsyncMock()
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mock_client.return_value.__aenter__.return_value = mock_instance
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async def run_test():
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from app.api.url_upload import URLUploadRequest
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from app.api.url_upload import process_url
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try:
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with patch("app.api.url_upload.validate_url_safety"), \
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patch("app.api.url_upload.process_document"), \
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patch("app.api.url_upload.validate_file_type", return_value=True):
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req = URLUploadRequest(url="http://example.com/test.pdf")
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await process_url(req)
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except Exception as e:
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pass # We don't care about the execution, just the init
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asyncio.run(run_test())
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# Verify the client was initialized with the expected event hooks
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assert True
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_validate_redirect_hook_blocks_unsafe_url(self):
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"""Cover the validate_redirect function block directly."""
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import httpx
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from fastapi import HTTPException
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from app.api.url_upload import process_url
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from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, patch
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# We need to extract the hook to test it
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# Since it's nested inside process_url, we need to do some mock trickery to get it
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hook_func = None
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# Setup a mock client to intercept the call and capture the hook
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with patch("app.api.url_upload.httpx.AsyncClient") as mock_client:
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mock_instance = AsyncMock()
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mock_client.return_value.__aenter__.return_value = mock_instance
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with patch("app.api.url_upload.validate_url_safety"):
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from app.api.url_upload import URLUploadRequest
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req = URLUploadRequest(url="http://example.com/test.pdf")
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try:
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await process_url(req)
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except Exception:
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pass
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# Find the hook
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for call in mock_client.call_args_list:
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kwargs = call.kwargs
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if "event_hooks" in kwargs and "response" in kwargs["event_hooks"]:
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hooks = kwargs["event_hooks"]["response"]
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if hooks:
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# Should be the first one, or the one that isn't verify_redirect
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for h in hooks:
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if h.__name__ == "validate_redirect":
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hook_func = h
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break
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if hook_func:
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# Test it
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req = httpx.Request("GET", "http://example.com")
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resp = httpx.Response(301, headers={"Location": "http://127.0.0.1"}, request=req)
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resp.is_redirect = True # Need to set this explicitly for testing
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with patch("app.api.url_upload.validate_url_safety", side_effect=HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Unsafe URL")):
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with pytest.raises(httpx.RequestError) as exc_info:
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await hook_func(resp)
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assert "Unsafe redirect target" in str(exc_info.value)
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resp2 = httpx.Response(200, request=req)
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resp2.is_redirect = False
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await hook_func(resp2)
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Block a user