Merge pull request #818 from christianlouis/sentinel/fix-path-traversal-3335474446649715249

🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix path traversal vulnerability in file utilities
This commit is contained in:
Christian Krakau-Louis
2026-03-23 17:07:36 +01:00
committed by GitHub
2 changed files with 17 additions and 2 deletions
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@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
## 2026-03-20 - Safe Path Traversal Prevention in Low-Level Utilities
**Vulnerability:** The generic file utility `hash_file` in `app/utils/file_operations.py` accepted any file path and was vulnerable to reading arbitrary files via path traversal (e.g., `../../../etc/passwd`) or absolute paths if an attacker could control the `filepath` argument.
**Learning:** Naively checking for `".." in path` breaks legitimate relative paths used internally by the application. Blocking absolute paths entirely also breaks functionality. Input validation should occur at the API boundary, but for defense-in-depth, low-level utilities must enforce expected boundaries (e.g., the application's `workdir`).
**Prevention:** Use `pathlib.Path.resolve()` on both the target path and the allowed base directory (`settings.workdir`). Ensure the resolved target path is strictly within the allowed boundary using `filepath_obj.relative_to(workdir_obj)`, catching the `ValueError` that is raised when the path is out of bounds. This safely blocks both relative traversal attacks and arbitrary absolute paths.
## 2025-05-18 - [SSRF Bypass via DNS Resolution Failure] ## 2025-05-18 - [SSRF Bypass via DNS Resolution Failure]
**Vulnerability:** The `is_private_ip` function in `app/utils/network.py` failed open (returned `False`) when a hostname could not be resolved (`socket.gaierror`). **Vulnerability:** The `is_private_ip` function in `app/utils/network.py` failed open (returned `False`) when a hostname could not be resolved (`socket.gaierror`).
**Learning:** This fail-open pattern was originally added to allow external domains in tests, but in production, it created a severe SSRF risk. An attacker could bypass SSRF protections by providing a URL that fails to resolve during the security check but resolves later (DNS rebinding), or by exploiting internal routing behaviors via unresolvable addresses. **Learning:** This fail-open pattern was originally added to allow external domains in tests, but in production, it created a severe SSRF risk. An attacker could bypass SSRF protections by providing a URL that fails to resolve during the security check but resolves later (DNS rebinding), or by exploiting internal routing behaviors via unresolvable addresses.
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@@ -7,8 +7,19 @@ def hash_file(filepath: str | Path, chunk_size: int = 65536) -> str:
Returns the SHA-256 hash of the file at 'filepath'. Returns the SHA-256 hash of the file at 'filepath'.
Reads the file in chunks to handle large files efficiently. Reads the file in chunks to handle large files efficiently.
""" """
from app.config import settings
filepath_obj = Path(filepath).resolve()
workdir_obj = Path(settings.workdir).resolve()
# Security check: Ensure the resolved path is strictly within the allowed workdir
try:
filepath_obj.relative_to(workdir_obj)
except ValueError:
raise FileNotFoundError(f"Access denied: path traversal attempt or file outside workdir '{filepath}'")
sha256 = hashlib.sha256() sha256 = hashlib.sha256()
with open(filepath, "rb") as f: with open(filepath_obj, "rb") as f:
while True: while True:
data = f.read(chunk_size) data = f.read(chunk_size)
if not data: if not data: