🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix SSRF in WebDAV connection test

Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
google-labs-jules[bot]
2026-03-15 04:10:11 +00:00
parent 7cd6252bf7
commit 8079db7893
6 changed files with 50 additions and 48 deletions
+3 -8
View File
@@ -574,14 +574,9 @@ def _test_webdav_connection(config: dict[str, Any] | None, credentials: dict[str
# Block requests to private/internal IPs to prevent SSRF
hostname = parsed.hostname or ""
if hostname:
try:
addr = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
if addr.is_private or addr.is_loopback or addr.is_link_local:
return {"success": False, "message": "URLs pointing to internal or private networks are not allowed"}
except ValueError:
# Hostname is not an IP literal — allow DNS names through
if hostname in ("localhost", "localhost.localdomain"):
return {"success": False, "message": "URLs pointing to localhost are not allowed"}
from app.utils.network import is_private_ip
if is_private_ip(hostname):
return {"success": False, "message": "URLs pointing to internal or private networks are not allowed"}
try:
import base64
+1 -31
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ from app.config import settings
from app.tasks.process_document import process_document
from app.utils.allowed_types import ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES
from app.utils.filename_utils import sanitize_filename
from app.utils.network import is_private_ip
# Set up logging
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -42,37 +43,6 @@ class URLUploadRequest(BaseModel):
return v
def is_private_ip(hostname: str) -> bool:
"""
Check if a hostname resolves to a private/internal IP address.
Protects against SSRF attacks by blocking access to internal networks.
"""
try:
# Try to parse as IP address directly
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
return ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_reserved
except ValueError:
# Not a direct IP, try to resolve hostname
try:
import socket
# Get all IP addresses for this hostname
addr_info = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None)
for info in addr_info:
ip_str = info[4][0]
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)
# Block if ANY resolved IP is private/internal
if ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_reserved:
return True
return False
except (socket.gaierror, socket.error):
# Cannot resolve - allow for testing/development
# In production, DNS should work properly
# Log this for debugging
logger.warning(f"Could not resolve hostname: {hostname}")
return False # Changed from True to False to allow external domains in tests
def validate_url_safety(url: str) -> None:
"""
Validate that URL is safe to fetch (SSRF protection).