🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix SSRF bypass on DNS resolution failure

Modified `is_private_ip` in `app/utils/network.py` to fail securely by returning True (blocking the request) when a hostname cannot be resolved. The previous implementation failed open, creating a risk for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and DNS rebinding attacks.

Updated corresponding tests to expect the secure behavior.

Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
google-labs-jules[bot]
2026-03-23 13:42:14 +00:00
parent ef897f660d
commit 8b4280d5dd
4 changed files with 23 additions and 15 deletions
+12
View File
@@ -698,6 +698,18 @@ class TestURLUploadCoverageGaps:
assert result is False
mock_getaddrinfo.assert_called_once()
@patch("app.utils.network.socket.getaddrinfo")
def test_is_private_ip_unresolvable_hostname_fails_securely(self, mock_getaddrinfo):
"""Test that unresolvable hostnames fail securely by blocking access."""
import socket
from app.utils.network import is_private_ip
mock_getaddrinfo.side_effect = socket.gaierror("Name or service not known")
result = is_private_ip("unresolvable.example.internal")
assert result is True # Fails securely
@patch("socket.getaddrinfo")
def test_is_private_ip_hostname_resolves_multiple_ips_all_public(self, mock_getaddrinfo):
"""Test hostname with multiple public IPs returns False (covers 65->61 loop branch)"""