Merge pull request #819 from christianlouis/copilot/sub-pr-808

Fix join_url sentinel hack, resolve merge conflicts, improve test isolation

.jules/sentinel.md

@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
+## 2026-03-20 - Safe Path Traversal Prevention in Low-Level Utilities
+**Vulnerability:** The generic file utility `hash_file` in `app/utils/file_operations.py` accepted any file path and was vulnerable to reading arbitrary files via path traversal (e.g., `../../../etc/passwd`) or absolute paths if an attacker could control the `filepath` argument.
+**Learning:** Naively checking for `".." in path` breaks legitimate relative paths used internally by the application. Blocking absolute paths entirely also breaks functionality. Input validation should occur at the API boundary, but for defense-in-depth, low-level utilities must enforce expected boundaries (e.g., the application's `workdir`).
+**Prevention:** Use `pathlib.Path.resolve()` on both the target path and the allowed base directory (`settings.workdir`). Ensure the resolved target path is strictly within the allowed boundary using `filepath_obj.relative_to(workdir_obj)`, catching the `ValueError` that is raised when the path is out of bounds. This safely blocks both relative traversal attacks and arbitrary absolute paths.
 ## 2025-05-18 - [SSRF Bypass via DNS Resolution Failure]
 **Vulnerability:** The `is_private_ip` function in `app/utils/network.py` failed open (returned `False`) when a hostname could not be resolved (`socket.gaierror`).
 **Learning:** This fail-open pattern was originally added to allow external domains in tests, but in production, it created a severe SSRF risk. An attacker could bypass SSRF protections by providing a URL that fails to resolve during the security check but resolves later (DNS rebinding), or by exploiting internal routing behaviors via unresolvable addresses.
-**Prevention:** Always fail securely in network authorization functions. If a domain cannot be resolved to verify its safety, the request must be blocked (`return True` / default-deny). Tests should mock DNS resolution correctly instead of compromising production security logic.
+**Prevention:** Always fail securely in network authorization functions. If a domain cannot be resolved to verify its safety, the request must be blocked (`return True` / default-deny). Tests should mock DNS resolution correctly instead of compromising production security logic.

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -12,6 +12,57 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
 
 ## Unreleased
 
+### Documentation
+
+- **changelog**: Update changelog [skip ci]
+  ([`0497fbb`](https://github.com/christianlouis/DocuElevate/commit/0497fbbbad71fd728e528498508bbfc7802dab70))
+
+- **changelog**: Update changelog [skip ci]
+  ([`45d3ac8`](https://github.com/christianlouis/DocuElevate/commit/45d3ac8cf07d39d49930dd6866f76e6015067b08))
+
+### Testing
+
+- Add assertions for task enqueuing parameters
+  ([`eeae47d`](https://github.com/christianlouis/DocuElevate/commit/eeae47ddec01339421e503ba484157e798750b8a))
+
+
+## Unreleased
+
+### Documentation
+
+- **changelog**: Update changelog [skip ci]
+  ([`45d3ac8`](https://github.com/christianlouis/DocuElevate/commit/45d3ac8cf07d39d49930dd6866f76e6015067b08))
+
+### Testing
+
+- Add assertions for task enqueuing parameters
+  ([`eeae47d`](https://github.com/christianlouis/DocuElevate/commit/eeae47ddec01339421e503ba484157e798750b8a))
+
+
+## Unreleased
+
+
+## v0.172.2 (2026-03-23)
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+- Adapt TemplateResponse calls to Starlette 1.0 new-style API
+  ([`c4e10be`](https://github.com/christianlouis/DocuElevate/commit/c4e10bee5e096e71a5bc4fac4928f69e5c04f2fb))
+
+- Update test assertions and lint fixes for Starlette 1.0 TemplateResponse API
+  ([`93629ff`](https://github.com/christianlouis/DocuElevate/commit/93629ff44083d43f79fdd49431457023e53d13e4))
+
+- **build**: Remove --omit=dev from npm ci in Dockerfile frontend-builder stage
+  ([`b4e0067`](https://github.com/christianlouis/DocuElevate/commit/b4e0067a27e2fb161349bd38c6d3b3f3bcb86972))
+
+### Documentation
+
+- **changelog**: Update changelog [skip ci]
+  ([`0841713`](https://github.com/christianlouis/DocuElevate/commit/084171395d1076c716aa500a516118db49468ff5))
+
+
+## Unreleased
+
 
 ## v0.172.2 (2026-03-23)
 

app/utils/file_operations.py

@@ -7,8 +7,19 @@ def hash_file(filepath: str | Path, chunk_size: int = 65536) -> str:
     Returns the SHA-256 hash of the file at 'filepath'.
     Reads the file in chunks to handle large files efficiently.
     """
+    from app.config import settings
+
+    filepath_obj = Path(filepath).resolve()
+    workdir_obj = Path(settings.workdir).resolve()
+
+    # Security check: Ensure the resolved path is strictly within the allowed workdir
+    try:
+        filepath_obj.relative_to(workdir_obj)
+    except ValueError:
+        raise FileNotFoundError(f"Access denied: path traversal attempt or file outside workdir '{filepath}'")
+
     sha256 = hashlib.sha256()
-    with open(filepath, "rb") as f:
+    with open(filepath_obj, "rb") as f:
         while True:
             data = f.read(chunk_size)
             if not data:

app/utils/network.py

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import ipaddress
 import logging
 import socket
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit, urlunsplit
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -36,12 +37,24 @@ def is_private_ip(hostname: str) -> bool:
 
 def join_url(base: str, *parts: str) -> str:
     """
-    Safely join a base URL and multiple path parts.
-    Handles double slashes while preserving the protocol '://'.
+    Safely join a base URL with one or more path parts.
+
+    Uses urllib.parse to correctly handle scheme/netloc/query/fragment so that
+    only the path component is modified.  Leading and trailing slashes are
+    stripped from each part before joining, preventing double-slash sequences
+    at segment boundaries without touching the scheme separator or query string.
+
+    Examples:
+        join_url("https://example.com/dav/", "/remote/", "file.pdf")
+        -> "https://example.com/dav/remote/file.pdf"
     """
-    url = "/".join([base, *parts])
-    url = url.replace("://", "$PLACEHOLDER$")
-    while "//" in url:
-        url = url.replace("//", "/")
-    url = url.replace("$PLACEHOLDER$", "://")
-    return url
+    parsed = urlsplit(base)
+    # Strip each part once and filter out empty segments; use walrus operator
+    # to avoid calling strip twice per iteration.
+    stripped_parts = [s for p in parts if (s := p.strip("/"))]
+    base_path = parsed.path.rstrip("/")
+    new_path = base_path + "/" + "/".join(stripped_parts) if stripped_parts else base_path
+    # Ensure path is non-empty so the reconstructed URL is valid.
+    if not new_path:
+        new_path = "/"
+    return urlunsplit((parsed.scheme, parsed.netloc, new_path, parsed.query, parsed.fragment))

tests/test_upload_to_nextcloud_join_url.py

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-import os
 from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
 
 import pytest
@@ -7,13 +6,13 @@ from app.tasks.upload_to_nextcloud import upload_to_nextcloud
 
 
 @pytest.fixture
-def mock_settings():
+def mock_settings(tmp_path):
     with patch("app.tasks.upload_to_nextcloud.settings") as mock:
         mock.nextcloud_upload_url = "http://nextcloud.local/"
         mock.nextcloud_username = "testuser"
         mock.nextcloud_password = "testpassword"
         mock.nextcloud_folder = "uploads"
-        mock.workdir = "/tmp/workdir"
+        mock.workdir = str(tmp_path)
         mock.http_request_timeout = 30
         yield mock
 
@@ -31,11 +30,10 @@ def mock_requests():
         yield mock
 
 
-def test_upload_to_nextcloud_url_construction(mock_settings, mock_requests):
-    file_path = "/tmp/workdir/test_file.txt"
+def test_upload_to_nextcloud_url_construction(tmp_path, mock_settings, mock_requests):
+    file_path = str(tmp_path / "test_file.txt")
 
     # Create dummy file
-    os.makedirs("/tmp/workdir", exist_ok=True)
     with open(file_path, "w") as f:
         f.write("test content")