Merge branch 'main' into sentinel/ssrf-redirect-bypass-15997970627137004397

.jules/sentinel.md

@@ -24,3 +24,7 @@
 **Vulnerability:** In `app/api/url_upload.py`, the `validate_url_safety` function was correctly verifying the initially requested URL to prevent fetching internal IPs or cloud metadata endpoints. However, the subsequent `httpx.AsyncClient` was configured with `follow_redirects=True` without validating the destination of those redirects. An attacker could bypass SSRF protections by providing a URL to an attacker-controlled server that responds with a 301/302 redirect pointing to an internal target (e.g., `http://127.0.0.1` or `http://169.254.169.254`).
 **Learning:** Checking the URL before sending the request is insufficient if the HTTP client automatically follows redirects. The target of every single redirect must be subject to the same strict validation as the initial request.
 **Prevention:** Avoid `follow_redirects=True` for user-provided URLs when possible. If redirects must be followed, attach an event hook (e.g., `event_hooks={"response": [hook_function]}`) to the `httpx` client to intercept the response, calculate the redirect destination from the `Location` header, and run the URL safety validation logic before the redirect is actually followed.
+## 2026-03-27 - SSRF Bypass via HTTP Redirects in httpx
+**Vulnerability:** The `/process-url` endpoint used `httpx.AsyncClient(follow_redirects=True)` after validating the initial user-provided URL against SSRF protections. However, it did not validate the target URLs of any subsequent HTTP redirects, allowing an attacker to provide a safe URL that redirects to an internal/private IP, bypassing the security check.
+**Learning:** Initial URL validation is insufficient when the HTTP client is configured to follow redirects automatically. The client must be explicitly configured to validate every redirect target.
+**Prevention:** When using `httpx.AsyncClient(follow_redirects=True)` for user-provided URLs, always implement a redirect validator hook function (e.g., using `event_hooks={'response': [validate_redirect]}`) that resolves the `Location` header and passes it through the same SSRF validation logic before the redirect is followed.

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -10,6 +10,30 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
 
 <!-- version list -->
 
+## Unreleased
+
+### Chores
+
+- **ci**: Ignore CVE-2026-4539 in pip-audit until pygments releases a fix
+  ([`6927e76`](https://github.com/christianlouis/DocuElevate/commit/6927e7643f9cbe1664f4a1a093511df5b079ed0a))
+
+### Documentation
+
+- **changelog**: Update changelog [skip ci]
+  ([`9b9882c`](https://github.com/christianlouis/DocuElevate/commit/9b9882c4d62691d0ddd20444e3b77bfe6eecc8c3))
+
+- **changelog**: Update changelog [skip ci]
+  ([`69053bf`](https://github.com/christianlouis/DocuElevate/commit/69053bfb08d3e2f12a86878044667ac500888837))
+
+- **changelog**: Update changelog [skip ci]
+  ([`76f202f`](https://github.com/christianlouis/DocuElevate/commit/76f202f7f1b94e39a4e79cd984770310599405bf))
+
+### Testing
+
+- Add tests for SSRF validation in integrations
+  ([`470f08d`](https://github.com/christianlouis/DocuElevate/commit/470f08d89322f2904b78a8b0f820973611486c26))
+
+
 ## Unreleased
 
 ### Chores

app/api/url_upload.py

@@ -170,6 +170,19 @@ async def process_url(
     if not safe_filename:
         safe_filename = "download"
 
+    # Hook to validate redirects and prevent SSRF
+    async def validate_redirect(response: httpx.Response):
+        if response.is_redirect:
+            location = response.headers.get("Location")
+            if location:
+                # Resolve relative URLs
+                next_url = urllib.parse.urljoin(str(response.url), location)
+                try:
+                    validate_url_safety(next_url)
+                except HTTPException as e:
+                    # Reraise as a RequestError so httpx aborts the request
+                    raise httpx.RequestError(f"Unsafe redirect target: {e.detail}", request=response.request)
+
     # Download file with security measures
     # Initialize target_path to None to prevent UnboundLocalError in exception handlers
     # that may execute before target_path is assigned during error cases
@@ -181,6 +194,7 @@ async def process_url(
         async with httpx.AsyncClient(
             timeout=settings.http_request_timeout,
             follow_redirects=True,
+            event_hooks={"response": [validate_redirect]},
             headers={
                 "User-Agent": "DocuElevate/1.0",  # Identify ourselves
             },