feat(auth): implement CSRF token protection for state-changing operations

Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
copilot-swe-agent[bot]
2026-02-22 16:27:37 +00:00
parent bb94eccd86
commit c54cbcbdd6
8 changed files with 545 additions and 1 deletions
+1
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@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ async def login(request: Request):
"show_oauth": OAUTH_CONFIGURED,
"oauth_provider_name": OAUTH_PROVIDER_NAME,
"app_version": settings.version, # Changed from app_version to version
"csrf_token": getattr(request.state, "csrf_token", ""),
},
)
+6
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@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ from app.auth import router as auth_router
from app.config import settings
from app.database import init_db
from app.middleware.audit_log import AuditLogMiddleware
from app.middleware.csrf import CSRFMiddleware
from app.middleware.rate_limit import create_limiter, get_rate_limit_exceeded_handler
from app.middleware.request_size_limit import RequestSizeLimitMiddleware
from app.middleware.security_headers import SecurityHeadersMiddleware
@@ -123,6 +124,11 @@ app.add_middleware(SecurityHeadersMiddleware, config=settings)
# See SECURITY_AUDIT.md Code Security section
app.add_middleware(RequestSizeLimitMiddleware, config=settings)
# 3) CSRF Protection Middleware - validates CSRF tokens for state-changing operations
# Only active when AUTH_ENABLED=True. Exempts OAuth callback endpoints.
# Tokens are stored in the session and validated via X-CSRF-Token header or form field.
app.add_middleware(CSRFMiddleware, config=settings)
# 2) Audit Logging Middleware - logs all requests with sensitive data masking
# Configure via AUDIT_LOGGING_ENABLED environment variable
# See SECURITY_AUDIT.md Infrastructure Security section
+162
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@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
CSRF Protection Middleware for DocuElevate.
This middleware implements Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) protection for all
state-changing HTTP operations (POST, PUT, DELETE, PATCH).
How it works:
- A cryptographically secure token is generated per session and stored in the session.
- The token is attached to ``request.state.csrf_token`` so Jinja2 templates can render it.
- For every state-changing request the middleware validates the submitted token by
checking (in order):
1. The ``X-CSRF-Token`` HTTP request header (used by AJAX / fetch calls).
2. The ``csrf_token`` field in ``application/x-www-form-urlencoded`` bodies
(used by traditional HTML forms such as the login form).
Multipart file-upload requests must always supply the token via the header.
- Validation is only enforced when ``AUTH_ENABLED=True``. When authentication is
disabled (development / single-user mode) the middleware is a no-op.
Exempt paths (CSRF is not checked even for state-changing methods):
- ``/oauth-callback`` OAuth 2.0 callback; protected by the ``state`` parameter.
"""
import logging
import secrets
from typing import Callable
from fastapi import Request, Response
from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
from starlette.responses import JSONResponse, RedirectResponse
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# HTTP methods that change server state and therefore require a valid CSRF token.
CSRF_PROTECTED_METHODS = {"POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "PATCH"}
# Paths that must never be CSRF-checked (e.g. OAuth flow endpoints that carry
# their own replay-protection mechanism).
CSRF_EXEMPT_PATHS = {
"/oauth-callback",
}
class CSRFMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
"""
Middleware that generates and validates CSRF tokens for state-changing requests.
Token lifecycle
---------------
1. On the first request for a session a 64-character hex token is created with
``secrets.token_hex(32)`` and stored in ``request.session["csrf_token"]``.
2. On every subsequent request the existing token is read from the session.
3. The token is always attached to ``request.state.csrf_token`` so that
Jinja2 templates (and response processors) can embed it.
Validation
----------
For ``POST``, ``PUT``, ``DELETE``, and ``PATCH`` requests the middleware
checks whether the submitted token matches the session token using a
constant-time comparison (``secrets.compare_digest``) to prevent timing
attacks.
Failure response
----------------
- API routes (``/api/*``): HTTP 403 JSON response.
- All other routes: HTTP 302 redirect to ``/login?error=…``.
"""
def __init__(self, app, config):
"""
Initialise the middleware.
Args:
app: The ASGI application.
config: Application settings object (``app.config.Settings``).
``config.auth_enabled`` controls whether CSRF enforcement is active.
"""
super().__init__(app)
self.config = config
self.enabled = config.auth_enabled
if self.enabled:
logger.info("CSRF protection middleware enabled")
else:
logger.info("CSRF protection middleware disabled (AUTH_ENABLED=False)")
async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Callable) -> Response:
"""
Process the request: generate/attach the token and validate it when required.
Args:
request: Incoming HTTP request.
call_next: Next middleware or route handler in the ASGI chain.
Returns:
HTTP response, or an error response when CSRF validation fails.
"""
if not self.enabled:
return await call_next(request)
# Generate or retrieve the per-session CSRF token.
csrf_token = request.session.get("csrf_token")
if not csrf_token:
csrf_token = secrets.token_hex(32)
request.session["csrf_token"] = csrf_token
# Attach token to request state so templates and route handlers can access it.
request.state.csrf_token = csrf_token
# Validate for state-changing methods on non-exempt paths.
if request.method in CSRF_PROTECTED_METHODS and request.url.path not in CSRF_EXEMPT_PATHS:
submitted_token = await self._get_submitted_token(request)
if not submitted_token or not secrets.compare_digest(csrf_token, submitted_token):
logger.warning(
f"[SECURITY] CSRF_VALIDATION_FAILED method={request.method} path={request.url.path}"
)
if request.url.path.startswith("/api/"):
return JSONResponse(
status_code=403,
content={"detail": "CSRF token missing or invalid"},
)
return RedirectResponse(url="/login?error=Invalid+request", status_code=302)
return await call_next(request)
@staticmethod
async def _get_submitted_token(request: Request) -> str | None:
"""
Extract the CSRF token submitted by the client.
Checks (in priority order):
1. ``X-CSRF-Token`` request header preferred for AJAX / fetch requests.
2. ``csrf_token`` form field in ``application/x-www-form-urlencoded`` bodies
used by plain HTML forms (e.g. the login form).
Multipart bodies (file uploads) are intentionally not parsed here to avoid
buffering large uploads in middleware; those endpoints must send the token
via the header instead.
Args:
request: The incoming HTTP request.
Returns:
The submitted CSRF token string, or ``None`` if not found.
"""
# 1. Check the request header (AJAX / fetch).
token = request.headers.get("X-CSRF-Token")
if token:
return token
# 2. For URL-encoded form bodies only (plain HTML form submissions).
content_type = request.headers.get("content-type", "")
if "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" in content_type:
try:
form = await request.form()
token = form.get("csrf_token")
if token:
return str(token)
except Exception as exc:
logger.debug(f"CSRF: could not parse form body: {exc}")
return None
+8 -1
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@@ -26,12 +26,19 @@ original_template_response = templates.TemplateResponse
def template_response_with_version(*args, **kwargs):
"""Wrapper for TemplateResponse to include version in all templates"""
"""Wrapper for TemplateResponse to include version and CSRF token in all templates"""
# If context dict is provided, add version to it
if len(args) >= 2 and isinstance(args[1], dict):
args[1].setdefault("version", settings.version)
# Inject CSRF token from request state when available
req = args[1].get("request")
if req is not None and hasattr(req.state, "csrf_token"):
args[1].setdefault("csrf_token", req.state.csrf_token)
elif "context" in kwargs and isinstance(kwargs["context"], dict):
kwargs["context"].setdefault("version", settings.version)
req = kwargs["context"].get("request")
if req is not None and hasattr(req.state, "csrf_token"):
kwargs["context"].setdefault("csrf_token", req.state.csrf_token)
return original_template_response(*args, **kwargs)