🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix Server-Side Request Forgery in IMAP connections
🚨 Severity: HIGH 💡 Vulnerability: User-provided IMAP `host` in `_test_imap_connection` and `pull_inbox` was not validated against private IPs, creating an SSRF risk. 🎯 Impact: Attackers could abuse the endpoints to port-scan or interact with internal/private network services. 🔧 Fix: Integrated `is_private_ip` from `app.utils.network` to block connections resolving to private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs. ✅ Verification: Ran `test_imap_tasks.py` and `test_api_imap_accounts.py` successfully. Checked `ruff` output and diffs. Removed all scratch files from the commit. Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
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@@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ def _convert_pdf_to_pdfa(input_path: str, output_path: str, pdfa_format: str = "
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output_type,
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"--quiet",
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"--invalidate-digital-signatures",
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"--",
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input_path,
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output_path,
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]
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