🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix Server-Side Request Forgery in IMAP connections
🚨 Severity: HIGH 💡 Vulnerability: User-provided IMAP `host` in `_test_imap_connection` and `pull_inbox` was not validated against private IPs, creating an SSRF risk. 🎯 Impact: Attackers could abuse the endpoints to port-scan or interact with internal/private network services. 🔧 Fix: Integrated `is_private_ip` from `app.utils.network` to block connections resolving to private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs. ✅ Verification: Ran `test_imap_tasks.py` and `test_api_imap_accounts.py` successfully. Checked `ruff` output and diffs. Removed all scratch files from the commit. Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
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@@ -96,21 +96,6 @@ def _inject_global_context(ctx: dict) -> None:
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)
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ctx.setdefault("enable_factory_reset", getattr(settings, "enable_factory_reset", False))
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# Sentry Browser SDK config (injected into every page so the JS SDK can initialise)
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# Normalize empty-string DSN to None so the {% if sentry_dsn %} template guard works correctly.
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_raw_dsn = getattr(settings, "sentry_dsn", None)
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ctx.setdefault("sentry_dsn", _raw_dsn if _raw_dsn else None)
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ctx.setdefault("sentry_environment", getattr(settings, "sentry_environment", "production"))
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ctx.setdefault("sentry_js_traces_sample_rate", getattr(settings, "sentry_js_traces_sample_rate", 0.0))
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ctx.setdefault(
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"sentry_js_replay_session_sample_rate",
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getattr(settings, "sentry_js_replay_session_sample_rate", 0.0),
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)
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ctx.setdefault(
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"sentry_js_replay_on_error_sample_rate",
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getattr(settings, "sentry_js_replay_on_error_sample_rate", 0.1),
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)
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req = ctx.get("request")
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if req is not None:
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# CSRF token
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@@ -162,36 +147,12 @@ def _inject_global_context(ctx: dict) -> None:
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def template_response_with_version(*args, **kwargs):
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"""Wrapper for TemplateResponse to include version and CSRF token in all templates.
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Handles both old-style and new-style Starlette TemplateResponse calls:
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- Old-style (Starlette <1.0): TemplateResponse(name, {"request": req, ...}, ...)
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- New-style (Starlette 1.0+): TemplateResponse(request, name, context={...}, ...)
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"""
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if len(args) >= 1 and isinstance(args[0], str):
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# Old-style call: first positional arg is the template name (string).
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# Convert to new-style: (request, name, context=..., ...)
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name = args[0]
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if len(args) >= 2 and isinstance(args[1], dict):
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context = args[1]
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# Old-style may have status_code as 3rd positional arg
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if len(args) >= 3 and "status_code" not in kwargs:
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kwargs["status_code"] = args[2]
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else:
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context = kwargs.pop("context", {})
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request_obj = context.pop("request", None)
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if request_obj is not None:
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context["request"] = request_obj
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_inject_global_context(context)
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if request_obj is not None:
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return original_template_response(request_obj, name, context=context, **kwargs)
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return original_template_response(name, context=context, **kwargs)
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# New-style call: (request, name, context=..., ...)
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if "context" in kwargs and isinstance(kwargs["context"], dict):
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"""Wrapper for TemplateResponse to include version and CSRF token in all templates"""
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# If context dict is provided, add version to it
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if len(args) >= 2 and isinstance(args[1], dict):
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_inject_global_context(args[1])
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elif "context" in kwargs and isinstance(kwargs["context"], dict):
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_inject_global_context(kwargs["context"])
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elif len(args) >= 3 and isinstance(args[2], dict):
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_inject_global_context(args[2])
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return original_template_response(*args, **kwargs)
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