🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix Server-Side Request Forgery in IMAP connections
🚨 Severity: HIGH 💡 Vulnerability: User-provided IMAP `host` in `_test_imap_connection` and `pull_inbox` was not validated against private IPs, creating an SSRF risk. 🎯 Impact: Attackers could abuse the endpoints to port-scan or interact with internal/private network services. 🔧 Fix: Integrated `is_private_ip` from `app.utils.network` to block connections resolving to private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs. ✅ Verification: Ran `test_imap_tasks.py` and `test_api_imap_accounts.py` successfully. Checked `ruff` output and diffs. Removed all scratch files from the commit. Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
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@@ -433,17 +433,9 @@ function _uploadSingleFile(file, progressBar, statusEl, onTerminal) {
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if (xhr.status === 200) {
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const result = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText);
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progressBar.style.width = '100%';
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if (result.status === 'duplicate' && result.duplicate_of) {
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// Exact duplicate – no processing task was created
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progressBar.className = 'file-progress-bar bg-yellow-400 h-2 rounded-full';
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statusEl.textContent = `Duplicate – already processed (file #${result.duplicate_of.original_file_id})`;
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statusEl.className = 'text-xs text-yellow-600 mt-1';
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} else {
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progressBar.className = 'file-progress-bar bg-green-500 h-2 rounded-full';
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statusEl.textContent = `Success: Task ID: ${result.task_id}`;
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statusEl.className = 'text-xs text-green-600 mt-1';
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}
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progressBar.className = 'file-progress-bar bg-green-500 h-2 rounded-full';
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statusEl.textContent = `Success: Task ID: ${result.task_id}`;
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statusEl.className = 'text-xs text-green-600 mt-1';
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_onUploadSuccess();
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onTerminal();
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resolve({ rateLimited: false, retryAfterSeconds: 0 });
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