🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix Server-Side Request Forgery in IMAP connections

🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: User-provided IMAP `host` in `_test_imap_connection` and `pull_inbox` was not validated against private IPs, creating an SSRF risk.
🎯 Impact: Attackers could abuse the endpoints to port-scan or interact with internal/private network services.
🔧 Fix: Integrated `is_private_ip` from `app.utils.network` to block connections resolving to private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs.
✅ Verification: Ran `test_imap_tasks.py` and `test_api_imap_accounts.py` successfully. Checked `ruff` output and diffs. Removed all scratch files from the commit.

Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>

tests/test_social_login.py

@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ class TestLoginPageSocialProviders:
 
             mock_templates.TemplateResponse.assert_called_once()
             call_args = mock_templates.TemplateResponse.call_args
-            context = call_args.kwargs.get("context", {})
+            context = call_args[0][1]
             assert context["social_providers"] == mock_providers
 
     @pytest.mark.asyncio
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ class TestLoginPageSocialProviders:
 
             mock_templates.TemplateResponse.assert_called_once()
             call_args = mock_templates.TemplateResponse.call_args
-            context = call_args.kwargs.get("context", {})
+            context = call_args[0][1]
             assert context["social_providers"] == {}