🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix Server-Side Request Forgery in IMAP connections

gitea-admin/gh-christianlouis-docuelevate

🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: User-provided IMAP `host` in `_test_imap_connection` and `pull_inbox` was not validated against private IPs, creating an SSRF risk.
🎯 Impact: Attackers could abuse the endpoints to port-scan or interact with internal/private network services.
🔧 Fix: Integrated `is_private_ip` from `app.utils.network` to block connections resolving to private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs.
✅ Verification: Ran `test_imap_tasks.py` and `test_api_imap_accounts.py` successfully. Checked `ruff` output and diffs.

Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>

This commit is contained in:

google-labs-jules[bot]

2026-03-23 14:38:34 +00:00

parent 6cc185a507

commit d71945b7b9

6 changed files with 64 additions and 0 deletions

									
										test_patch.py
									
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				import re

				with open("app/api/imap_accounts.py", "r") as f:

				    content = f.read()

				if "is_private_ip" in content:

				    print("Patch successful!")

				else:

				    print("Patch failed!")