🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: User-provided IMAP `host` in `_test_imap_connection` and `pull_inbox` was not validated against private IPs, creating an SSRF risk.
🎯 Impact: Attackers could abuse the endpoints to port-scan or interact with internal/private network services.
🔧 Fix: Integrated `is_private_ip` from `app.utils.network` to block connections resolving to private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs.
✅ Verification: Ran `test_imap_tasks.py` and `test_api_imap_accounts.py` successfully. Checked `ruff` output and diffs. Removed all scratch files from the commit.
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
get_current_owner_id() only checked the session for authenticated users.
When the mobile app sends Authorization: Bearer <token>, there is no
session cookie, so the Depends(_get_owner_id) dependency raised HTTP 401
before the @require_login wrapper could resolve the Bearer token.
The function now checks three sources in order:
1. Session user dict (existing behavior)
2. request.state.api_token_user (cached by require_login or prior call)
3. Direct Bearer token resolution via _resolve_bearer_user (new)
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
copilot-swe-agent[bot]