Adds validation using `is_private_ip()` for user-provided hosts in `_test_imap_connection` and `_test_s3_connection` to prevent Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities.
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: User-provided IMAP `host` in `_test_imap_connection` and `pull_inbox` was not validated against private IPs, creating an SSRF risk.
🎯 Impact: Attackers could abuse the endpoints to port-scan or interact with internal/private network services.
🔧 Fix: Integrated `is_private_ip` from `app.utils.network` to block connections resolving to private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs.
✅ Verification: Ran `test_imap_tasks.py` and `test_api_imap_accounts.py` successfully. Checked `ruff` output and diffs. Removed all scratch files from the commit.
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
The `_test_webdav_connection` function previously used `urllib.request.urlopen`
to verify connection credentials. This triggers a Bandit B310 warning because
`urllib` supports multiple schemes (like file://, ftp://) and implicitly follows
redirects.
Although scheme checking and a basic `is_private_ip` validation were implemented,
using `urllib.request` remains risky because a public URL could return an
HTTP redirect to a private IP (e.g., 127.0.0.1) which `urllib` would blindly follow,
causing an SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) bypass.
This commit replaces `urllib.request` with `httpx.request` using explicitly
`follow_redirects=False`. This eliminates the B310 vulnerability, ensures
requests only hit the specified URL without following potentially malicious
redirects, and standardizes the application on `httpx` for safer HTTP connections.
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
google-labs-jules[bot]