🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: User-provided IMAP `host` in `_test_imap_connection` and `pull_inbox` was not validated against private IPs, creating an SSRF risk.
🎯 Impact: Attackers could abuse the endpoints to port-scan or interact with internal/private network services.
🔧 Fix: Integrated `is_private_ip` from `app.utils.network` to block connections resolving to private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs.
✅ Verification: Ran `test_imap_tasks.py` and `test_api_imap_accounts.py` successfully. Checked `ruff` output and diffs. Removed all scratch files from the commit.
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
Merge origin/main into branch, resolving conflict in app/database.py.
Combined improvements from both branches:
- Keep pool_pre_ping=True and structured variable approach from feature branch
- Add explicit QueuePool import and poolclass assignment from main
Introduces a Redis-backed sliding-window rate limiter for upload
endpoints (/api/ui-upload, /api/process-url) that:
- Enforces per-user limits (default: 20 uploads / 60 s)
- Dynamically reduces limits under system stress (queue depth, CPU load)
- Returns 429 with Retry-After header when exceeded
- Fails open when Redis is unavailable
- Works with the existing client-side adaptive back-off
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
Add detailed diagnostic log statements throughout the local authentication
path to help identify why valid local user logins are failing.
Changes:
- app/auth.py: log received username, multi_user_enabled status, LocalUser
DB lookup result, is_active status, password verification outcome, and
the specific failure reason (empty_username / wrong_password / no_match)
at every decision point. Also log form keys and Content-Type header on
empty-username failures to detect Starlette body-consumption issues.
- app/middleware/csrf.py: log Content-Type, form field names, and whether
the CSRF token was present in _get_submitted_token() to reveal if the
middleware is consuming form data before the endpoint can read it.
- app/utils/local_auth.py: verify_password() now logs DEBUG on mismatch
and WARNING (with exception type) on unexpected bcrypt errors instead
of silently swallowing exceptions.
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
- Add RequestSizeLimitMiddleware that checks Content-Length header
before request body is read: non-multipart requests capped at
MAX_REQUEST_BODY_SIZE (default 1 MB), multipart uploads capped at
MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE (default 1 GB). Returns HTTP 413 on violation.
- Register middleware in app/main.py
- Add max_request_body_size setting to app/config.py
- Fix ui_upload in files.py to check Content-Length early and read
in 64 KB chunks (bounded memory usage), removing the post-write
os.path.getsize check
- Document MAX_REQUEST_BODY_SIZE in .env.demo and ConfigurationGuide.md
- Mark SECURITY_AUDIT.md item #4 as resolved
- Add 9 tests in test_request_size_limit.py
- Update test_upload_file_too_large to use patch.object instead of
the now-unused os.path.getsize mock
Closes#173
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
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