- fix(api/dropbox): _require_admin bypasses auth when AUTH_ENABLED=False,
fixing all 5 TestSaveDropboxSettings failures
- fix(api/onedrive): same AUTH_ENABLED bypass in _require_admin; fix one-arg
update_env_file call using env_utils version for token rotation
- fix(auth): update login TemplateResponse to Starlette 1.0+ API
(request as first arg instead of in context dict)
- fix(api/local_auth): update all TemplateResponse calls to Starlette 1.0+ API
- fix(views/share): update TemplateResponse call to Starlette 1.0+ API
- fix(api/billing): update TemplateResponse call to Starlette 1.0+ API
- fix(tests/test_imap_tasks): mock is_private_ip for tests using
imap.example.com (unresolvable in sandboxed/CI environments)
- fix(tests): update TemplateResponse call_args assertions to new API
(call_args.kwargs['context'] instead of call_args[0][1])
- fix(tests): update fake_original signatures in dark_mode tests
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/christianlouis/DocuElevate/sessions/52d7b7b7-3a71-4a96-b2b1-b675b8a6d3b4
🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: User-provided IMAP `host` in `_test_imap_connection` and `pull_inbox` was not validated against private IPs, creating an SSRF risk.
🎯 Impact: Attackers could abuse the endpoints to port-scan or interact with internal/private network services.
🔧 Fix: Integrated `is_private_ip` from `app.utils.network` to block connections resolving to private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs.
✅ Verification: Ran `test_imap_tasks.py` and `test_api_imap_accounts.py` successfully. Checked `ruff` output and diffs. Removed all scratch files from the commit.
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>