🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: User-provided IMAP `host` in `_test_imap_connection` and `pull_inbox` was not validated against private IPs, creating an SSRF risk.
🎯 Impact: Attackers could abuse the endpoints to port-scan or interact with internal/private network services.
🔧 Fix: Integrated `is_private_ip` from `app.utils.network` to block connections resolving to private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs.
✅ Verification: Ran `test_imap_tasks.py` and `test_api_imap_accounts.py` successfully. Checked `ruff` output and diffs. Removed all scratch files from the commit.
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
- Improve warning log in _resolve_categories_for_profile() to include
exception type name for better troubleshooting
- Add SQLAlchemy IS NULL comment to imap_profiles.py filter
- Pass default_categories from server to template to avoid hardcoded
category list in JS (now uses {{ default_categories | tojson }})
- Simplify view profiles query (remove redundant unauthenticated path)
- Update docs: ConfigurationGuide.md and EmailIngestion.md with
full profiles documentation including category table and API reference
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>