🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: User-provided IMAP `host` in `_test_imap_connection` and `pull_inbox` was not validated against private IPs, creating an SSRF risk.
🎯 Impact: Attackers could abuse the endpoints to port-scan or interact with internal/private network services.
🔧 Fix: Integrated `is_private_ip` from `app.utils.network` to block connections resolving to private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs.
✅ Verification: Ran `test_imap_tasks.py` and `test_api_imap_accounts.py` successfully. Checked `ruff` output and diffs. Removed all scratch files from the commit.
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
- Update DeploymentGuide.md with scaling instructions and beat service info
- Update KubernetesDeployment.md with unauthenticated probe paths and beat note
- Update ProductionReadiness.md with new health endpoints table and beat guidance
- Update API.md with new healthz/live and healthz/ready endpoint docs
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
google-labs-jules[bot]