🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: User-provided IMAP `host` in `_test_imap_connection` and `pull_inbox` was not validated against private IPs, creating an SSRF risk.
🎯 Impact: Attackers could abuse the endpoints to port-scan or interact with internal/private network services.
🔧 Fix: Integrated `is_private_ip` from `app.utils.network` to block connections resolving to private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs.
✅ Verification: Ran `test_imap_tasks.py` and `test_api_imap_accounts.py` successfully. Checked `ruff` output and diffs. Removed all scratch files from the commit.
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
- Add LocaleProvider + useLocale() hook with AsyncStorage persistence to mobile i18n
- Replace all hardcoded English strings in every screen with t() calls
- Add missing profile.settings/language keys to all 5 translation files (en/de/es/fr/it)
- Wrap app root in LocaleProvider; apply server preferred_language on login in AuthGuard
- Tab labels and header titles now re-render on language switch
- ProfileScreen: use useLocale() context, sync language to server via POST /api/i18n/language
- Backend: add preferred_language field to GET /api/mobile/whoami response
- Mobile API: add preferred_language to WhoAmIResponse type + setServerLanguage() method
- Tests: add test_whoami_returns_preferred_language and test_whoami_no_profile_preferred_language_is_null
- Docs: update MobileApp.md with language sync priority and whoami response format
Language priority: server preference > AsyncStorage > device locale > English fallback
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>