Files
gh-christianlouis-docuelevate/app/utils
google-labs-jules[bot] 1018ea17d9 🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix path traversal vulnerability in file utilities
🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: The generic file hashing utility `app/utils/file_operations.py:hash_file` was vulnerable to path traversal. An attacker controlling the `filepath` argument could read arbitrary files on the system by passing relative paths like `../../../etc/passwd` or providing absolute paths directly.
🎯 Impact: This could lead to Arbitrary File Read and potential information disclosure.
🔧 Fix: Used `pathlib.Path.resolve()` to resolve both the target file path and the allowed base directory (`settings.workdir`). Added a strict check to ensure the resolved target path is strictly within the allowed boundary using `filepath_obj.relative_to(workdir_obj)`, catching the `ValueError` raised when the path is out of bounds. This safely blocks both relative traversal attacks and arbitrary absolute paths, without breaking legitimate relative application paths.
 Verification: Ran the test suite `pytest tests/test_path_traversal_security.py -v` successfully, which explicitly checks for `FileNotFoundError` upon traversal attempts.

Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-23 15:53:18 +00:00
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2026-03-16 09:12:15 +00:00
2026-03-15 04:10:28 +00:00