d22175310a
🚨 Severity: HIGH 💡 Vulnerability: User-provided IMAP `host` in `_test_imap_connection` and `pull_inbox` was not validated against private IPs, creating an SSRF risk. 🎯 Impact: Attackers could abuse the endpoints to port-scan or interact with internal/private network services. 🔧 Fix: Integrated `is_private_ip` from `app.utils.network` to block connections resolving to private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs. ✅ Verification: Ran `test_imap_tasks.py` and `test_api_imap_accounts.py` successfully. Checked `ruff` output and diffs. Removed all scratch files from the commit. Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
270 lines
9.8 KiB
Python
270 lines
9.8 KiB
Python
"""
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API endpoint for processing files from URLs
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"""
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import logging
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import mimetypes
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import os
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import urllib.parse
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import uuid
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from typing import Optional
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import aiofiles
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import httpx
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from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request
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from pydantic import BaseModel, HttpUrl, field_validator
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from app.auth import require_login
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from app.config import settings
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from app.tasks.process_document import process_document
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from app.utils.allowed_types import ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES
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from app.utils.filename_utils import sanitize_filename
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from app.utils.network import is_private_ip
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# Set up logging
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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router = APIRouter()
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class URLUploadRequest(BaseModel):
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"""Request model for URL-based file upload"""
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url: HttpUrl
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filename: Optional[str] = None
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@field_validator("url")
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@classmethod
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def validate_url_scheme(cls, v):
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"""Ensure only HTTP/HTTPS schemes are allowed"""
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parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(str(v))
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if parsed.scheme not in ["http", "https"]:
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raise ValueError("Only HTTP and HTTPS URLs are allowed")
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return v
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def validate_url_safety(url: str) -> None:
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"""
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Validate that URL is safe to fetch (SSRF protection).
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Raises:
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HTTPException: If URL is unsafe
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"""
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parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
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# Check scheme
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if parsed.scheme not in ["http", "https"]:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Only HTTP and HTTPS URLs are supported")
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# Check hostname exists
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if not parsed.hostname:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid URL: no hostname")
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# Block private/internal IPs (SSRF protection)
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if is_private_ip(parsed.hostname):
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=400,
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detail="Access to private/internal IP addresses is not allowed for security reasons",
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)
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# Block well-known metadata endpoints (cloud provider SSRF)
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metadata_endpoints = [
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"169.254.169.254", # AWS, Azure, GCP metadata
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"metadata.google.internal", # GCP
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"169.254.169.253", # AWS link-local
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]
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if parsed.hostname in metadata_endpoints:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Access to cloud metadata endpoints is not allowed")
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def validate_file_type(content_type: str, filename: str) -> bool:
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"""
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Validate that the file type is supported (i.e. processable by Gotenberg).
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Args:
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content_type: MIME type from response headers
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filename: Filename to check extension
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Returns:
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True if file type is allowed
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"""
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# Check content type from header
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if content_type:
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# Handle content-type with charset (e.g., "application/pdf; charset=utf-8")
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base_content_type = content_type.split(";", maxsplit=1)[0].strip().lower()
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if base_content_type in ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES:
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return True
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# Also check by extension as fallback
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_, ext = os.path.splitext(filename)
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if ext:
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guessed_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(filename)
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if guessed_type and guessed_type in ALLOWED_MIME_TYPES:
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return True
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return False
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@router.post("/process-url")
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@require_login
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async def process_url(request: Request, url_request: URLUploadRequest):
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"""
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Download a file from a URL and enqueue it for processing.
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Security features:
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- SSRF protection: blocks private IPs, localhost, cloud metadata endpoints
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- File type validation: only allows supported document/image types
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- File size limits: enforces maximum upload size
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- Timeout protection: prevents hanging on slow/malicious servers
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Args:
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request: Starlette Request object (used by require_login decorator)
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url_request: URLUploadRequest with url and optional filename
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Returns:
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JSON with task_id and status
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Raises:
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HTTPException: If URL is invalid, unsafe, or file cannot be processed
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"""
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url = str(url_request.url)
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# Validate URL safety (SSRF protection)
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validate_url_safety(url)
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# Parse URL to extract filename if not provided
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if url_request.filename:
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original_filename = url_request.filename
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else:
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# Extract filename from URL path
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parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
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path = parsed.path
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original_filename = os.path.basename(path) if path else "download"
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# Sanitize filename
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safe_filename = sanitize_filename(original_filename)
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if not safe_filename:
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safe_filename = "download"
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# Download file with security measures
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# Initialize target_path to None to prevent UnboundLocalError in exception handlers
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# that may execute before target_path is assigned during error cases
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target_path = None
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try:
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logger.info(f"Downloading file from URL: {url}")
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# Use configured timeout to prevent hanging
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async with httpx.AsyncClient(
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timeout=settings.http_request_timeout,
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follow_redirects=True,
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headers={
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"User-Agent": "DocuElevate/1.0", # Identify ourselves
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},
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) as client:
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async with client.stream("GET", url) as response:
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response.raise_for_status()
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# Validate content type
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content_type = response.headers.get("Content-Type", "")
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if not validate_file_type(content_type, safe_filename):
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=400,
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detail=f"Unsupported file type: {content_type}. "
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"Supported types: PDF, Office documents, images, plain text",
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)
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# Check content length before downloading
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content_length = response.headers.get("Content-Length")
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if content_length:
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file_size = int(content_length)
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max_size = settings.max_upload_size
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if file_size > max_size:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=413,
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detail=f"File too large: {file_size} bytes (max {max_size} bytes)",
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)
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# Generate unique filename
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unique_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
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# Check for extension using original_filename to avoid any CodeQL issues
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# with safe_filename which is derived from the URL directly.
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if "." in original_filename:
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_, ext = os.path.splitext(original_filename)
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# Strip out the leading dot and any non-alphanumeric chars
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clean_ext = "".join(c for c in ext if c.isalnum())
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if not clean_ext:
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clean_ext = "bin"
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target_filename = f"{unique_id}.{clean_ext}"
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else:
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target_filename = unique_id
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target_path = os.path.join(settings.workdir, target_filename)
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# Download file in chunks to handle large files
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downloaded_size = 0
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max_size = settings.max_upload_size
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async with aiofiles.open(target_path, "wb") as f:
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async for chunk in response.aiter_bytes(chunk_size=8192):
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if chunk:
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await f.write(chunk)
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downloaded_size += len(chunk)
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# Check size during download
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if downloaded_size > max_size:
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# Remove partial file
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await f.close()
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os.remove(target_path)
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=413,
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detail=f"File too large: exceeded {max_size} bytes during download",
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)
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logger.info(f"Downloaded file from URL '{url}' as '{target_filename}' ({downloaded_size} bytes)")
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# Enqueue for processing
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task = process_document.delay(target_path, original_filename=safe_filename)
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return {
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"task_id": task.id,
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"status": "queued",
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"message": "File downloaded from URL and queued for processing",
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"filename": safe_filename,
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"size": downloaded_size,
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}
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except httpx.TimeoutException:
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logger.error(f"Timeout while downloading file from URL: {url}")
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raise HTTPException(status_code=408, detail="Request timeout: server took too long to respond")
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except httpx.ConnectError as e:
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logger.error(f"Connection error while downloading file from URL: {url} - {str(e)}")
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raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail=f"Failed to connect to URL: {str(e)}")
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except httpx.HTTPStatusError as e:
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logger.error(f"HTTP error while downloading file from URL: {url} - {str(e)}")
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raise HTTPException(status_code=e.response.status_code, detail=f"HTTP error: {str(e)}")
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except httpx.RequestError as e:
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logger.error(f"Error downloading file from URL: {url} - {str(e)}")
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raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to download file: {str(e)}")
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except HTTPException:
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# Re-raise FastAPI HTTPExceptions (validation errors, file too large, etc.)
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raise
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except OSError as e:
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logger.error(f"Error saving file from URL: {url} - {str(e)}")
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# Clean up partial file if it exists
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if target_path and os.path.exists(target_path):
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os.remove(target_path)
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raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to save file: {str(e)}")
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except Exception as e:
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logger.exception(f"Unexpected error processing URL: {url}")
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# Clean up partial file if it exists
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if target_path and os.path.exists(target_path):
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os.remove(target_path)
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raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Unexpected error: {str(e)}")
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