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google-labs-jules[bot] 5b41d32f90 🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix Server-Side Request Forgery in webhooks
Adds validation to webhook URLs before attempting to deliver them to prevent
SSRF attacks targeting private IP ranges, local host, and cloud metadata endpoints.
Validates URL schema, hostname, and applies `is_private_ip()`. Also resolved ruff linting
errors. Tests have been expanded to ensure validation covers all cases.

Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-17 15:04:09 +00:00

629 B

2025-02-14 - SSRF vulnerability in webhook outgoing requests

Vulnerability: Found an SSRF vulnerability where outgoing webhook requests could hit private IPs or metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254). Learning: This existed because the url parameter provided for webhooks (app/utils/webhook.py and app/utils/user_notification.py) was not being checked before being passed to requests.post() or httpx.post(). Prevention: Make sure to always validate URL scheme and hostname with is_private_ip() and block known cloud metadata endpoints before doing outgoing network requests based on dynamic values.