google-labs-jules[bot]
d71945b7b9
🚨 Severity: HIGH 💡 Vulnerability: User-provided IMAP `host` in `_test_imap_connection` and `pull_inbox` was not validated against private IPs, creating an SSRF risk. 🎯 Impact: Attackers could abuse the endpoints to port-scan or interact with internal/private network services. 🔧 Fix: Integrated `is_private_ip` from `app.utils.network` to block connections resolving to private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs. ✅ Verification: Ran `test_imap_tasks.py` and `test_api_imap_accounts.py` successfully. Checked `ruff` output and diffs. Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
1.2 KiB
2024-05-24 - SSRF in WebDAV connection test
Vulnerability: The _test_webdav_connection function had a custom SSRF check that failed to resolve DNS names, allowing attackers to bypass the check by providing a domain that resolves to an internal IP (e.g., 127.0.0.1).
Learning: DNS resolution is required for robust SSRF protection when validating URLs provided by users.
Prevention: Use a centralized is_private_ip function (now in app/utils/network.py) that resolves the hostname to its IPs and checks if any are private.
2026-03-19 - Prevent SSRF in IMAP Connection Testing
Vulnerability: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) allowed users to port-scan or connect to internal services via user-provided host and port inputs in IMAP endpoints (/test and pull_inbox).
Learning: Endpoints testing outbound connections with user-provided configurations must validate the destination host before attempting the connection to prevent exploitation of the server's network position.
Prevention: Use network utilities like is_private_ip that resolve hostnames and block private/loopback/reserved IPs before establishing outbound connections.