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🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix Server-Side Request Forgery in IMAP connections

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🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: User-provided IMAP `host` in `_test_imap_connection` and `pull_inbox` was not validated against private IPs, creating an SSRF risk.
🎯 Impact: Attackers could abuse the endpoints to port-scan or interact with internal/private network services.
🔧 Fix: Integrated `is_private_ip` from `app.utils.network` to block connections resolving to private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs.
✅ Verification: Ran `test_imap_tasks.py` and `test_api_imap_accounts.py` successfully. Checked `ruff` output and diffs.

Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
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google-labs-jules[bot]
2026-03-23 14:38:34 +00:00
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**Vulnerability:** The `_test_webdav_connection` function had a custom SSRF check that failed to resolve DNS names, allowing attackers to bypass the check by providing a domain that resolves to an internal IP (e.g., `127.0.0.1`).
**Learning:** DNS resolution is required for robust SSRF protection when validating URLs provided by users.
**Prevention:** Use a centralized `is_private_ip` function (now in `app/utils/network.py`) that resolves the hostname to its IPs and checks if any are private.
## 2026-03-19 - Prevent SSRF in IMAP Connection Testing
**Vulnerability:** Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) allowed users to port-scan or connect to internal services via user-provided `host` and `port` inputs in IMAP endpoints (`/test` and `pull_inbox`).
**Learning:** Endpoints testing outbound connections with user-provided configurations must validate the destination host before attempting the connection to prevent exploitation of the server's network position.
**Prevention:** Use network utilities like `is_private_ip` that resolve hostnames and block private/loopback/reserved IPs before establishing outbound connections.