Adds validation to webhook URLs before attempting to deliver them to prevent
SSRF attacks targeting private IP ranges, local host, and cloud metadata endpoints.
Validates URL schema, hostname, and applies `is_private_ip()`. Also resolved ruff linting
errors. Tests have been expanded to ensure validation covers all cases.
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: The `/process-url` endpoint used `httpx.AsyncClient` with `follow_redirects=True`. While the initial user-provided URL was validated against SSRF protections (blocking private/internal IPs), the client implicitly followed subsequent HTTP redirects without validating their target locations. This allowed an attacker to bypass the initial check by supplying a valid URL that redirected to an internal IP or cloud metadata endpoint.
🎯 Impact: An attacker could potentially access internal network services or cloud metadata endpoints.
🔧 Fix: Implemented an `event_hooks` listener (`validate_redirect`) on the `httpx.AsyncClient` that intercepts responses, extracts the `Location` header, resolves the absolute target URL, and applies the same `validate_url_safety` check before allowing the redirect to be followed.
✅ Verification: Ran `pytest tests/test_url_upload.py`, formatting checks via `ruff format` and linting via `ruff check`.
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
Adds validation using `is_private_ip()` for user-provided hosts in `_test_imap_connection` and `_test_s3_connection` to prevent Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities.
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: The generic file hashing utility `app/utils/file_operations.py:hash_file` was vulnerable to path traversal. An attacker controlling the `filepath` argument could read arbitrary files on the system by passing relative paths like `../../../etc/passwd` or providing absolute paths directly.
🎯 Impact: This could lead to Arbitrary File Read and potential information disclosure.
🔧 Fix: Used `pathlib.Path.resolve()` to resolve both the target file path and the allowed base directory (`settings.workdir`). Added a strict check to ensure the resolved target path is strictly within the allowed boundary using `filepath_obj.relative_to(workdir_obj)`, catching the `ValueError` raised when the path is out of bounds. This safely blocks both relative traversal attacks and arbitrary absolute paths, without breaking legitimate relative application paths.
✅ Verification: Ran the test suite `pytest tests/test_path_traversal_security.py -v` successfully, which explicitly checks for `FileNotFoundError` upon traversal attempts.
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
Modified `is_private_ip` in `app/utils/network.py` to fail securely by returning True (blocking the request) when a hostname cannot be resolved. The previous implementation failed open, creating a risk for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and DNS rebinding attacks.
Updated corresponding tests to expect the secure behavior and correctly appended the security finding to the Sentinel journal.
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: User-provided IMAP `host` in `_test_imap_connection` and `pull_inbox` was not validated against private IPs, creating an SSRF risk.
🎯 Impact: Attackers could abuse the endpoints to port-scan or interact with internal/private network services.
🔧 Fix: Integrated `is_private_ip` from `app.utils.network` to block connections resolving to private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs.
✅ Verification: Ran `test_imap_tasks.py` and `test_api_imap_accounts.py` successfully. Checked `ruff` output and diffs. Removed all scratch files from the commit.
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: User-provided IMAP `host` in `_test_imap_connection` and `pull_inbox` was not validated against private IPs, creating an SSRF risk.
🎯 Impact: Attackers could abuse the endpoints to port-scan or interact with internal/private network services.
🔧 Fix: Integrated `is_private_ip` from `app.utils.network` to block connections resolving to private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs.
✅ Verification: Ran `test_imap_tasks.py` and `test_api_imap_accounts.py` successfully. Checked `ruff` output and diffs.
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
Modified `is_private_ip` in `app/utils/network.py` to fail securely by returning True (blocking the request) when a hostname cannot be resolved. The previous implementation failed open, creating a risk for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and DNS rebinding attacks.
Updated corresponding tests to expect the secure behavior.
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
The `_test_webdav_connection` function previously used `urllib.request.urlopen`
to verify connection credentials. This triggers a Bandit B310 warning because
`urllib` supports multiple schemes (like file://, ftp://) and implicitly follows
redirects.
Although scheme checking and a basic `is_private_ip` validation were implemented,
using `urllib.request` remains risky because a public URL could return an
HTTP redirect to a private IP (e.g., 127.0.0.1) which `urllib` would blindly follow,
causing an SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) bypass.
This commit replaces `urllib.request` with `httpx.request` using explicitly
`follow_redirects=False`. This eliminates the B310 vulnerability, ensures
requests only hit the specified URL without following potentially malicious
redirects, and standardizes the application on `httpx` for safer HTTP connections.
Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
google-labs-jules[bot]