google-labs-jules[bot]
d22175310a
🚨 Severity: HIGH 💡 Vulnerability: User-provided IMAP `host` in `_test_imap_connection` and `pull_inbox` was not validated against private IPs, creating an SSRF risk. 🎯 Impact: Attackers could abuse the endpoints to port-scan or interact with internal/private network services. 🔧 Fix: Integrated `is_private_ip` from `app.utils.network` to block connections resolving to private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs. ✅ Verification: Ran `test_imap_tasks.py` and `test_api_imap_accounts.py` successfully. Checked `ruff` output and diffs. Removed all scratch files from the commit. Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com>
5 lines
545 B
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5 lines
545 B
Markdown
## 2024-05-24 - SSRF in WebDAV connection test
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**Vulnerability:** The `_test_webdav_connection` function had a custom SSRF check that failed to resolve DNS names, allowing attackers to bypass the check by providing a domain that resolves to an internal IP (e.g., `127.0.0.1`).
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**Learning:** DNS resolution is required for robust SSRF protection when validating URLs provided by users.
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**Prevention:** Use a centralized `is_private_ip` function (now in `app/utils/network.py`) that resolves the hostname to its IPs and checks if any are private.
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