copilot-swe-agent[bot]
1a195a96bd
- Merge origin/main into branch (resolve conflict in integrations_dashboard.html) - Add defensive JSON parsing with try/except for integration.config - Wrap tester() call in try/except to prevent 500 errors from bad config - Add i18n key integrations.connection_test_failed_fallback in en.json - Reference i18n key in template JS fallback message - Update SECURITY_AUDIT.md: add fix date (2026-03-23), update doc date - Remove accidental revert.sh file - Fix missing MagicMock/patch imports in test file - Add tests for invalid JSON config and tester exception error paths Co-authored-by: christianlouis <361235+christianlouis@users.noreply.github.com> Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/christianlouis/DocuElevate/sessions/daebb70e-059a-4601-8864-88eef49f99cf
9 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
9 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
## 2026-03-20 - Safe Path Traversal Prevention in Low-Level Utilities
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**Vulnerability:** The generic file utility `hash_file` in `app/utils/file_operations.py` accepted any file path and was vulnerable to reading arbitrary files via path traversal (e.g., `../../../etc/passwd`) or absolute paths if an attacker could control the `filepath` argument.
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**Learning:** Naively checking for `".." in path` breaks legitimate relative paths used internally by the application. Blocking absolute paths entirely also breaks functionality. Input validation should occur at the API boundary, but for defense-in-depth, low-level utilities must enforce expected boundaries (e.g., the application's `workdir`).
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**Prevention:** Use `pathlib.Path.resolve()` on both the target path and the allowed base directory (`settings.workdir`). Ensure the resolved target path is strictly within the allowed boundary using `filepath_obj.relative_to(workdir_obj)`, catching the `ValueError` that is raised when the path is out of bounds. This safely blocks both relative traversal attacks and arbitrary absolute paths.
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## 2025-05-18 - [SSRF Bypass via DNS Resolution Failure]
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**Vulnerability:** The `is_private_ip` function in `app/utils/network.py` failed open (returned `False`) when a hostname could not be resolved (`socket.gaierror`).
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**Learning:** This fail-open pattern was originally added to allow external domains in tests, but in production, it created a severe SSRF risk. An attacker could bypass SSRF protections by providing a URL that fails to resolve during the security check but resolves later (DNS rebinding), or by exploiting internal routing behaviors via unresolvable addresses.
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**Prevention:** Always fail securely in network authorization functions. If a domain cannot be resolved to verify its safety, the request must be blocked (`return True` / default-deny). Tests should mock DNS resolution correctly instead of compromising production security logic.
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